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The Financial Services Authority ("FSA") is an independent non-governmental body, quasi-judicial body and a company limited by guarantee that regulates the financial services industry in the United Kingdom. Its main office is based in Canary Wharf, London, with another office in Edinburgh. When acting as the competent authority for listing of shares on a stock exchange, it is referred to as the UK Listing Authority (UKLA), and maintains the Official list. The FSA's Chairman and CEO are Callum McCarthy (to be replaced by Lord Turner of Ecchinswell from September 2008 [1]) and Hector Sants.
HistoryThe FSA has the legal form of a company limited by guarantee (number 01920623). It was incorporated on 7 June 1985 under the name of The Securities and Investments Board Ltd (SIB) at the instigation of the UK Chancellor of the Exchequer, who is the sole member of the company and who delegated certain statutory regulatory powers to it under the then Financial Services Act 1986. After a series of scandals in the 1990s culminating in the collapse of Barings Bank, there was a desire to bring to an end the self-regulation of the financial services industry and to consolidate regulation responsibilities which had been split amongst multiple regulators. The SIB revoked the recognition of The Financial Intermediaries, Managers and Brokers Regulatory Association (FIMBRA) as a Self-Regulatory Organisation (SRO) in June 1994 subject to a transitional wind-down period to provide for continuity of regulation whilst members moved to the Personal Investment Authority (PIA), which in turn was subsumed. The SIB changed its name to the FSA on 28 October 1997 and now exercises statutory powers given to it by the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, which replaced the earlier legislation and came into force on 1 December 2001. In addition to regulating banks, insurance companies and financial advisers, the FSA has regulated mortgage business from 31 October 2004 and general insurance (excluding travel insurance) intermediaries from 14 January 2005. Statutory objectivesThe Financial Services and Markets Act imposed four statutory objectives upon the FSA:
Regulatory principlesThe statutory objectives are supported by a set of principles of good regulation which the FSA must have regard to when discharging its functions. These are:
Accountability and managementThe FSA is accountable to Treasury Ministers, and through them to Parliament. It is operationally independent of Government and is funded entirely by the firms it regulates through fines, fees and compulsory levies. Its Board consists of a Chairman, a Chief Executive Officer, a Chief Operating Officer, two Managing Directors, and 11 non-executive directors (including a lead non-executive member, the Deputy Chairman) selected by, and subject to removal by, HM Treasury. Among these, the Deputy Governor for Financial Stability of the Bank of England is an ex officio Board member. This Board decides on overall policy with day-to-day decisions and management of the staff being the responsibility of the Executive. This is divided into three sections each headed by a Managing director and having responsibility for one of the following sectors: retail markets, wholesale and institutional markets, and regulatory services. Its regulatory decisions can be appealed to the Financial Services and Markets Tribunal. HM Treasury decides upon the scope of activities that should be regulated, but it is for the FSA to decide what shape the regulatory regime should take in relation to any particular activities. The FSA is also provided with advice on the interests and concerns of consumers by the Financial Services Consumer Panel [2]. This panel describes itself as "An Independent Voice for Consumers of Financial Services". Members of the panel are appointed and can be dismissed by the FSA and emails to them are directed to FSA staff. The Financial Services Consumer Panel will not address individual consumer complaints. Retail consumersThe FSA has a priority of making retail markets for financial products and services work more effectively, and so help retail consumers to get a fair deal. Over several years, the FSA has developed work to raise levels of confidence and capability among consumers. Since 2004, this work is described as a national strategy[3] on building financial capability in the UK. This programme is comparable to financial education and literacy strategies in other OECD countries, including the United States. The FSA boardThe FSA is governed by a Board appointed by HM Treasury.
Activities that must be regulated by the FSACompanies involved in any of the following activities must be regulated by the FSA. • Accepting deposits Actions relating to the 2007/2008 credit crunch crisisThe FSA has been held by some observers to be weak and inactive in allowing irresponsible banking to precipitate the credit crunch which commenced in 2007, and which has involved the shrinking of the UK housing market, increasing unemployment (especially in the financial and building sectors), the public acquisition of Northern Rock in mid-February 2008, and the takeover of HBOS by Lloyds TSB. On the 18th of September 2008, the FSA announced a ban on short selling to reduce volatility in difficult markets.[4]
Certainly, the FSA's implementation of capital requirements for banks has been lax relative to some other countries. For example, it has been reported[5] that Australia's Commonwealth Bank is measured as having 7.6% Tier 1 capital under the rules of the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, but this would be measured as 10.1% if the bank was under the jurisdiction of the FSA. Criticism of the FSAThe FSA rarely takes on wider implication cases. For example, thousands of consumers have complained to the Financial Ombudsman Service about payment protection insurance and bank charges. However, despite determining that there was a problem in the selling of PPI[6][7][8], the FSA has taken effective action against very few firms in the case of PPI and it was the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) that finally took on the wider implications role in the case of bank charges. The FSA and the FOS have staff placed within their co-organisation in order to advise on wider implication issues. It is surprising, therefore, that so little action has taken place. The FSA in an internal report into the handling of the collapse in confidence of customers of the Northern Rock Plc describe themselves as indequate [9]. It's reported that in order to prevent such a situation occurring again, the FSA is considering allowing a bank to delay revealing to the public when it gets into financial difficulties.[10] The FSA was criticised in the final report of the European Parliament's inquiry into the crisis of the Equitable Life Assurance Society. [11] It is widely reported that the long awaited Parliamentry Ombudsman's investigation into the government's handling of Equitable Life is equally scathing of the FSA's handling of this case[12] The FSA ignored warning signals from Northern Rock building society and continued to allow the bank to operate without a risk mitigation programme for months before the bank's collapse. [13] The FSA has been criticised by some within the IFA community for increasing fees charged to firms and for the perceived retroactive application of current standards to historic business practices.[citation needed] FSA regulation is also often regarded as reactive rather than proactive.[citation needed] In 2004-05 the FSA was actively involved in crackdowns against financial advice firms who were involved in the selling of split-cap investment trusts and precipice bonds, with some success in restoring public confidence.[citation needed]. However, despite heavily criticising split-cap investment trusts, in 2007 it suddenly abandoned it's investigation.[14] Where it has been rather poorer in its remit is in actively identifying and investigating possible future issues of concern, and addressing them accordingly.[citation needed] There have also been some questions raised about the competence of FSA staff.[15] The composition of the FSA board appears to consist mainly of representatives of the financial services industry and career civil servants. There are no representatives of consumer groups. As the FSA was created as a result of criticism of the self-regulating nature of the financial services industry, having an independent authority staffed mainly by members of the same industry could be perceived as not providing any further advantage to consumers. Although one of the prime responsibilities of the FSA is to protect consumers, The FSA has been active in trying to ensure companies' anonymity when they have been involved in misselling activity, preferring to side with the companies that have been found guilty rather than consumers.[16][17] It was announced in November 2008, that despite self-acknowledged failures by the FSA in effectively regulating the financial services industry, taxpayers money would be handed out to FSA staff in bonuses. [18] More Principles Based RegulationThere were suggestions that the FSA stifles the UK financial services industry through over-regulation, following a leaked letter from Prime Minister Tony Blair during 2005. This incident led Callum McCarthy, then Chief Executive of the FSA, to formally write to the Prime Minister asking him to either explain his opinions or retract them.[19] The Prime Minister's criticisms were viewed as particularly surprising since the FSA's brand of light-touch financial regulation has typically been popular with banks and financial institutions in comparison with the more prescriptive rules-based regulation employed by the US Securities and Exchange Commission and by other European regulators;[20] by contrast, most critiques of the FSA accuse it of instigating a regulatory "race to the bottom" aimed at attracting foreign companies at the expense of consumer protection.[21] The FSA counters that its move away from rules-based regulation towards more principles-based regulation, far from weakening its consumer protection goals, can in fact strengthen them: "Our Principles are rules. We can take enforcement action on the basis of them; we have already done so; and we intend increasingly to do so where it is appropriate to do so."[22] As an example, the enforcement action taken in late 2006 against firms mis-selling payment protection insurance was based on their violation of principle six of the FSA's Principles for Business ("a firm must pay due regard to the interests of its customers and treat them fairly"), rather than requiring the use of the sort of complex technical regulations that many in financial services find burdensome.[23] Enforcement casesThe FSA has been attacked for its supposedly weak enforcement program.[24][25][26] For example, while FSMA prohibits insider trading, the FSA has only successfully prosecuted two insider dealing cases, both involving defendants who did not contest the charges.[27] Likewise, since 2001, the FSA has only sought insider trading fines eight times against individuals and companies it regulates,[28] despite the FSA's own studies indicating that unexplained price movements occurs prior to around 25 percent of all UK corporate merger announcements.[29] After the HBOS Insider trading scandal, The FSA informed MPs on 6 May 2008 that they planned to crack down on inside trading more effectively and that the results of their efforts would be seen in 2008/09[30] On 22 June, the Daily Telegraph reported that the FSA had wrapped up their case into HBOS insider trading and no action would be taken[31]. On 26 June, the HBOS Chairman said that "There is a strong case for believing that the UK is exceptionally bad at dealing with white-collar crime".[32] On 29 July 2008, however, it was announced that the Police, acting on information supplied by the FSA, had arrested workers at UBS and JP Morgan Cazenove for alleged insider dealing and that this was the 3rd case within a week. [33] A year after the subprime mortgage crisis had made global headlines, The FSA levied a record £900,000 on an IFA for selling subprime mortgages [34] Notes
For criticism of the slogan "principles-based" regulation, see Lawrence A. Cunningham, A Prescription to Retire the Rhetoric of 'Principles-Based Systems' in Corporate Law, Securities Regulation and Accounting (2007). For a comparative look at "principles-based" regulation in the United Kingdom and Canada, see Cristie L. Ford, New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-Based Securities Regulation (2007). External links
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